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Abstract Without financing frictions, profit taxes reduce investment by their effect
on the user cost of capital. With financing constraints, investment becomes sensitive
to cash-flow. In this situation, even small taxes impose first order welfare losses, and
ACE and cash-flow tax systems are no longer neutral. When banks become active
and provide monitoring services in addition to finance, an ACE tax yields larger in-
vestment and welfare than an equal yield cash-flow tax.
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1 Introduction
When discussing the effects of profit taxation, the tax reform literature often relies on
models with full information, where firms have unimpeded access to external capital.
The paper was presented in research seminars of the Universities of Munich and St. Gallen and the
Institute for Advanced Studies, at the Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet in Marseille, the annual
symposium of the Oxford Center for Business Taxation, the workshop ‘Economics of Ownership,
Organization and Industrial Development’ in Stockholm, and the German Norwegian Seminar in
Public Economics in Munich. We benefited from constructive comments by seminar participants,
Alan Auerbach, Steven Bond, Mihir Desai, Michael Devereux and, in particular, our discussants
Christian Traxler, Mikael Stenkula and Johannes Becker. We are particularly grateful for detailed
suggestions and constructive comments by two anonymous referees and the editor, Eckhard Janeba.
C. Keuschnigg () · E. Ribi
FGN-HSG, University of St. Gallen, Varnbuelstrasse 19, 9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland
e-mail: Christian.Keuschnigg@unisg.ch
E. Ribi
e-mail: Evelyn.Ribi@unisg.ch
C. Keuschnigg
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria
Profit taxes and financing constraints 809
Accordingly, investment is expanded until the marginal return is equal to the user
cost of capital. Taxes affect investment only by their impact on the user cost (cf.
Jorgenson 1963, and Auerbach 2002, for a recent review). The corporate finance
literature, however, provides substantial evidence that the relationship between firms
and outside investors is subject to information problems that tend to limit the amount
of external funds. Hence, firms with profitable investment opportunities are often
subject to financing constraints, which prevent them from investing the desired, first
best amount of capital (see, among others, Hubbard 1998; Tirole 2001, 2006; Beck
et al. 2005; Beck and Demirgüc-Kunt 2006; Aghion et al. 2007).
This paper studies how profit taxes may affect investment and welfare in the pres-
ence of financial constraints. In particular, we show how the effects of taxes change
when banks become more active and provide monitoring services in addition to ex-
ternal funds. The analysis rests on corporate finance theory as in Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997) and Tirole (2006) which explains credit constraints by entrepreneurial
moral hazard. The capacity to raise credit depends on the amount of pledgeable in-
come available for repayment to banks. Investment becomes sensitive to cash-flow
and own assets. Relating to the main predictions of this paper, Kaplan and Zingales
(1997, p. 174) state that “. . . in an imperfect capital market world, investments are
sensitive to internal funds; while in a perfect capital market world, they are not”.
Empirical studies measuring cash-flow sensitivity find that investment expands by a
factor of 1.2–1.3 per dollar of cash-flow (cf. Fazzari and Petersen 1993; Calomiris
and Hubbard 1995; Carpenter and Petersen 2002).
Financing constraints are relevant for small and medium sized firms but often also
for larger ones. Schaller (1993) and Chirinko and Schaller (1995) find correlations
between equipment investment and internal funds around 0.4 for small firms, which
are higher than the corresponding values of around 0.2 for large firms. Young inno-
vative firms are more likely to become credit-rationed. R&D intensive firms typically
have large investment opportunities compared to own funds, are more dependent on
entrepreneurial inputs and, for this reason, are more difficult to monitor. Guiso (1998)
shows that innovative firms are more likely to be constrained, which makes them un-
able to fully exploit their growth potential. The correlation between investment and
own cash-flow is also significantly higher for R&D intensive investments (Brown and
Petersen 2009).
Apart from firm’s size, R&D intensity and productivity, constrained and uncon-
strained firms also differ in their banking relationship (cf. Petersen and Rajan 1994;
Degryse and Ongena 2005). When firms have close ties to banks, the informational
asymmetry is reduced, and they are more likely to obtain the required funding. Hoshi
et al. (1990) indeed report investment–cash-flow sensitivities of only around 0.05 for
these firms in Japan, whereas correlations for independent firms vary between 0.45
and 0.5. Similar numbers are found by Schaller (1993) and Chirinko and Schaller
(1995). Gorton and Schmid (2000) find that firm performance improves with bank
equity holdings and stress a monitoring and advising role of banks. Investigating
a sample of Japanese firms, Fukuda and Hirota (1996) document that a close rela-
tionship to the main bank reduces agency costs and allows firms to raise more debt.
Apart from raising firms’ debt capacity, active intermediaries, such as venture capi-
talists and relationship banks, may also add value to firms by increasing their survival
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chances and helping them to grow larger.1 Based on this evidence, we conclude that
financing constraints may be relevant arguably for the most innovative parts of the
business sector, can significantly affect a country’s performance, and can partly be
relaxed by a more active role of banks.
How taxes affect investment of constrained firms differs from standard theory
where investment exclusively depends on the user cost of capital. This paper de-
rives three results. We first show that taxes, by eroding cash-flow and pledgeable
income, tighten financing constraints and reduce investment, independently of their
effect on the user cost. Even small tax rates impose first order welfare losses when
firms are constrained. These firms are unable to fully exploit investment opportunities
and, thus, earn an above normal, excess return on marginal investment. The welfare
loss is proportional to the excess return. Our second result demonstrates that neither
a CF (cash-flow) nor an ACE (allowance for corporate equity) tax system is neutral
when firms are constrained. CF and ACE taxes feature prominently in the tax re-
form debate.2 According to standard theory, these two tax systems are neutral with
respect to the scale of investment, and equivalent when both are required to raise the
same present value of tax revenue (see Sandmo 1979; Boadway and Bruce 1984, for
models under certainty; and Bond and Devereux 1995, 2003, under uncertainty). In
taxing rents, however, they reduce firms’ pledgeable income and the scale of invest-
ment. Slightly less obvious, we still find the two tax systems to be equivalent.
In generalizing the result on the equivalence of CF and ACE taxes to the case of
constrained firms, we have assumed that banks are competitive and are not engaged in
active oversight of firms (cf. Diamond 1984), as the literature on relationship banking
and venture capital documents. The quality of monitoring services might be consid-
ered an important aspect of financial development. Our third and most important re-
sult shows that the equivalence between ACE and CF taxes breaks down when banks
are active in monitoring and control of financially dependent firms. The ACE tax re-
duces investment and welfare less than an equal yield CF tax. Active intermediaries
may directly add value by advising firms. The non-contractibility of monitoring and
advising leads to double moral hazard where not only managerial effort but also the
banks’ advising must be incentivized. The timing of tax liabilities becomes important.
While the CF tax provides tax relief upfront, the ACE tax gives relief at the late return
stage, thereby providing better incentives, and leads to higher success probabilities,
scale of investment and welfare.3
Early empirical literature in public economics already emphasized the important
role of internal funds and the different effects of taxes on investment in the presence
1This is a frequent finding in the venture capital literature; see, e.g., Hellmann and Puri (2002).
2The CF tax was recommended by Meade (1978) and the US President’s Advisory Panel (2006). The ACE
system was proposed by the Capital Taxes Group of the Institute for Fiscal Studies (1991) and is adopted
in the Mirrlees Review (Mirrlees et al. 2011, and background studies in Mirrlees et al. 2010).
3In a Separate Appendix (available on www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/54285), we consider an al-
ternative model with heterogeneous firms where monitoring of constrained firms does not directly add
value and raise the success probability. It rather exercises active oversight and control, thereby raising
pledgeable income and improving a firm’s access to external financing. Again, an ACE tax yields larger
investment and welfare than an equal-yield CF tax. Although the result is qualitatively the same, the mech-
anism is different. Compared to a CF tax, the ACE system redistributes from unconstrained firms where
capital earns a normal return, towards constrained firms where capital earns an excess return.
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of financing constraints (Fazzari et al. 1988a, 1988b; Hubbard 1998). One strand of
the theoretical literature is based on moral hazard; see Hagen and Sannarnes (2007)
and Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2004) and references therein.4 Hagen and Sannarnes
(2007) also show that an ACE tax is not neutral and leads to underinvestment in
effort, but do not discuss the CF tax. The key difference is that these authors assume
that effort translates into variable success probabilities while the scale of investment
is fixed. Our model endogenizes the scale of investment and provides a clear link to
standard user cost theory as it applies in the absence of financing frictions. Another
strand of the literature assumes a different type of agency problems along the lines of
Jensen (1986) where self-serving, empire building managers divert free cash-flow to
internal investments with a lower rate of return, compared to investment opportunities
outside the firm (see Chetty and Saez 2010, and, in the same vein, Köthenbürger and
Stimmelmayr 2009). Clearly, this approach is complementary to our analysis and
relates to mature firms which are not constrained in outside funding but rather face
the opposite problem of having ‘free cash-flow’ that might be inefficiently invested
internally rather than being distributed to shareholders. None of these papers provides
a comparison of CF and ACE taxes and discusses their potential non-equivalence.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model and compares
equal yield CF and ACE taxes. Section 3 considers active intermediation and shows
that an ACE tax facilitates constrained investment and gives higher welfare relative to
an equal yield CF tax. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix documents some technical
calculations.
2 The basic model
2.1 Full information benchmark
The analysis is based on a model with risk-neutral entrepreneurs. Investment I is
successful with probability p. In this case, the firm’s end-of-period value is I + f (I)
where f ′(I ) > 0 > f ′′(I ). If the firm fails, the end-of-period value is zero. If a unit
of capital were invested in the deposit market, it would yield a safe rate of return r
and lead to an end-of-period value R ≡ 1 + r .5 Given an opportunity cost IR, the
net value is π = p(I + f ) − IR.6 An investment with a safe return r is equivalent to
a risky investment with a return i only in the good state if the zero profit condition
p(1+ i) = R is satisfied. Using this, expected value is π = p(f − iI ). In the absence
of tax and financial frictions, value maximizing investment is given by f ′(I ) = i.
Suppose that the firm is endowed with own assets or inside equity A. If spending
exceeds own funds, the firm must borrow D from external sources. We assume that
4Part of the literature introduces monitoring costs in reduced form which depend on total assets and exter-
nal debt; see Kanniainen and Södersten (1994), for example.
5The paper aims to compare the effects of ACE and CF taxes. To keep this focus, we assume the deposit
rate to be exogenous and thereby exclude general equilibrium feedback effects of tax reform.
6In the following, we will write f and suppress the argument I when convenient.
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external borrowing is done in the form of debt, new equity being excluded.7 In intro-
ducing taxes, we focus on two polar cases, the CF (cash-flow) and ACE (allowance
for corporate equity) taxes. The CF tax denies any deduction of interest expenses.
Instead, it permits immediate tax depreciation of investment outlays I and thereby
reduces the tax liability by τI at the beginning of period where τ is the proportional
profit tax rate. Private investment outlays are, thus, reduced to (1−τ)I . The firm must
pay back when capital is disinvested, thus raising tax liability by τI at the end of pe-
riod if the firm survives. The expected net value of the tax credit is τIR−τpI = τpiI
since the risky and safe interest are related by p(1+ i) = R. The ACE tax, in contrast,
permits the deduction of interest costs i(D +A) on both debt and equity but does not
allow for any upfront deduction of investment outlays. To define the tax base under
both systems, we denote by s the share of investment outlays eligible for immedi-
ate tax deductions, and by λ the share of deductible interest costs. Setting s = 1 and
λ = 0 yields a CF tax and s = 0 and λ = 1 an ACE tax. Private investment spending
is financed with debt and equity, (1 − τs)I = D + A. The expected fiscal revenue G
thus amounts to
G = pT − τsIR, T = τ [f − λi(D + A) + sI ]. (1)
At the end of period, the firm pays tax only if it is successful, giving expected rev-
enue pT . Unlike real world tax systems, ACE and CF taxes treat debt and equity
in a perfectly symmetric way so that they are perfect substitutes in our model. Re-
placing R and D + A, we also find that the two systems, at a given level of in-
vestment and earnings, generate the same total value of expected revenue, GACE =
pτ(f − iI ) = GCF. The key difference is that the CF tax concentrates tax liability
at the end of period but grants a tax rebate at the beginning of period. The ACE tax,
in contrast, is front loaded. Tax is high at the beginning (no tax rebate) while it is
kept low at the end of period when earnings accrue: T ACE = τ(f − iI ) < T CF =
τ(f + I ).8
Given the tax system in (1), net firm value π is divided between the entrepreneur,
πe , and the bank, πb , as follows:
πe = p(I + f − (1 + i)D − T ) − AR,
πb = p(1 + i)D − DR, (2)
π = p(I + f − T ) − (1 − τs)IR.
7Our simple two-state model cannot distinguish between debt and new outside equity (see Tirole 2006),
but this is also not the focus of our analysis. Ellingsen and Kristiansen (2011) offer an interesting but more
complicated approach that introduces debt as well as outside equity.
8Note finally that a pure CF tax permits negative tax payments. Suppose own funds stem from previous
profits A0 minus tax, A = (1 − τ)A0. The financing identity D = (1 − τ)(I −A0) shows that a financially
dependent firm gets a tax rebate, i.e. τ(A0 − I ) < 0. The net value of tax liability is G = τp(f + I ) +
τ(A0 − I )R. Allowing tax losses to be carried forward changes the end of period tax liability in the good
state to G = τp[f − iI + (1 + i)A0]. Apart from the tax related to historical profit A0, the carry forward
of tax losses essentially converts the CF tax into an ACE tax. If neither a tax refund nor a carry forward of
tax losses were possible, the CF would no longer be neutral in the unconstrained case, and would be more
distorting in a constrained equilibrium.
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The opportunity cost of equity is AR. The bank incurs refinancing costs on the deposit
market equal to R per unit of lending. Without financial frictions, competitive banks
can lend any amount subject to the break even condition πb = 0, or p(1 + i) = R.
The borrowing rate i must exceed the deposit rate r by an intermediation margin that
reflects the rate of default. The owner is entitled to the cash-flow after taxes and debts
have been paid. With banks making zero profit, and noting (1 − τs)I = A + D, the
entrepreneur’s expected surplus is equal to the total surplus, πe = π = p[(1 − τ)f −
(1 − τλ)(1 − τs)iI ]. Value maximization leads to
f ′(I ) = (1 − τλ)(1 − τs)
1 − τ · i ≡ u(τ). (3)
The firm invests until the return on capital equals the user cost. Both possibilities of
tax deduction reduce the user cost of capital u. The full information case replicates
the neutrality result of Bond and Devereux (2003) for CF and ACE taxes, defined
by s = 1, λ = 0 and s = 0, λ = 1, respectively. In the absence of market imperfec-
tions, both systems yield f ′ = i in (3) and lead to efficient investment. Since CF and
ACE taxes also yield the same level of net revenue G = pτ(f − iI ), they are fully
equivalent.
CF and ACE taxes are known to be neutral in the standard model both in sit-
uations of certainty and uncertainty (Boadway and Bruce 1984; Bond and Dev-
ereux 2003). One question is whether the ACE system should allow the deduc-
tion of the cost of finance at the safe or at the higher risky interest rate. Bond
and Devereux (1995, Eq. (6)) argue that an ACE tax must allow for the opportu-
nity cost of finance, evaluated at the safe rate of interest r when full loss-offset
is granted. Under these conditions, the period 1 tax liability with ACE would be
T = τpf − τrI + τ [p(I − I ) − (1 − p)I ]. The square bracket lists the tax conse-
quences of selling the asset. In the absence of depreciation, book value equals market
value, leaving a zero capital gain in case of success and a capital loss of −I when the
firm fails. With full loss-offset, the firm must get a tax refund of −τrI from interest
expenses, and of −τI from full loss-offset when the market value falls to zero. Rear-
ranging yields T = τ [p(I + f ) − RI ] = τp(f − iI ) which corresponds to (1). The
present analysis assumes deduction of financing costs at the risky loan rate i without
loss-offset. By (1), the firm owes τ(f − iI ) if successful but receives no tax refund
when it fails. The expected tax liability is the same under both assumptions. The two
alternatives are equivalent.
2.2 Finance constrained investment
A standard way of rationalizing financing constraints is to introduce a moral hazard
problem which creates conflicting interests of outside investors and the managing
owner. It is assumed that the success probability of the firm depends on discrete man-
agerial effort. When the entrepreneur exerts effort, she generates a high success prob-
ability p, but must forego private benefits. Alternatively, she can spend only reduced
effort and, instead, consume private benefits B > 0, leading to a low success rate
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pL < p. We assume that these benefits increase linearly with investment, B = bI .9 It
is assumed that effort is not verifiable and not contractible and must thus be induced
by financial incentives. The timing is: (i) government policy; (ii) external borrowing
and investment; (iii) managerial effort; (iv) outcomes and payments depending on
success or failure.
Given moral hazard, owner-managers must keep a sufficient profit stake to assure
incentives which limits external financing. The entrepreneur chooses effort after a
financing contract has been secured, i.e., debt and interest are already given at this
stage. To highlight the reward for effort, we rewrite the surplus in (2) as πe = pve −
AR, where
ve ≡ I + f − T − (1 + i)D = (1 − τ)(f − uI) + (1 + i)A. (4)
The entrepreneur prefers high effort as long as the contract is incentive compatible:10
pve ≥ pLve + bI ⇔ ve ≥ βI, β ≡ b/(p − pL). (5)
To elicit high effort, outside investors must cede a large enough stake to the managing
owner. Given that the entrepreneur must earn at least βI , the bank can demand at most
(1 + i)D ≤ I +f −T −βI , see (4). The right-hand side is pledgeable income which
is the maximum incentive compatible repayment that a firm can offer.
Assumption 1 At the unrestricted investment level, given by f ′(IFB) = u, the incen-
tive compatibility condition is violated, i.e., (1 − τ)[f (IFB) − uIFB] + (1 + i)A <
βIFB.
In principle, the firm’s own equity A could be so large that the incentive constraint
is slack at the optimal investment level in (3). The solution would be the same as
in the preceding section. If own funds are rather small and optimal investment IFB
requires high debt, the entrepreneur’s residual income becomes so small that high
effort is not rewarded anymore. In this case, the entrepreneur would prefer low effort
and the success probability would fall to pL, possibly close to zero, giving an inferior
outcome.11 To avoid this, investment and bank lending must be restricted until the
9Linearity is for convenience only. The typical assumption would be convex increasing effort costs, here
private benefits. Since the return on investment is concave by f (I), convexity is not needed.
10Ellul et al. (2010) offer an alternative and largely equivalent formulation of credit constraints where the
owner may divert part of output for private use. Owners must then keep a minimum income to prevent di-
version of resources (instead of preventing low effort) which reduces pledgeable income and limits outside
funding.
11In spite of private benefits, investment is not distorted when the financing constraint is slack. To show
this, we abstract from tax and denote by π∗
H
= maxI p(f (I ) − iI ) the surplus with high effort when no
private benefits are enjoyed. First best investment IH is given by f ′(IH ) = i. With low effort, the surplus
is π∗
L
= maxI pL(f (I ) − iLI) + bI . The risky loan rate is high, iL > i, when the success probability is
low, pL(1 + iL) = R. Investment is distorted, f ′(IL) = iL − b/pL . We assume πH (I) > πL(I) for any
I ∈ [0,max{IH , IL}], i.e., high effort is preferred for any investment level in this range. The optimum is,
thus, π∗
H
and IH . When the incentive constraint is slack and high effort is anticipated, private benefits are
not consumed, leading to undistorted investment. When the constraint binds, it restricts external lending
and investment to Ic < IH so that high effort remains assured. The surplus is reduced but still exceeds the
maximized surplus with low effort, π∗
H
> πH (Ic) > π
∗
L
.
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Fig. 1 Constrained investment
required credit repayment does not exceed pledgeable income. The incentive com-
patibility condition (5) is binding and implicitly determines investment. Multiplying
by p and using (4) as well as πe = π with zero profit in banking shows that the
incentive constraint is equivalent to
π = p(1 − τ)(f (I) − uI) = pβI − AR. (6)
Proposition 1 With a binding financing constraint, investment is not driven by the
user cost of capital but depends, instead, on pledgeable income and own assets. Con-
strained firms earn an excess return on investment ρ ≡ (1− τ)p(f ′(I )−u) such that
pβ > ρ > 0.
By the definition of credit rationing, a firm could expand investment and earn
higher profit but is denied credit, implying dπe/dI = ρ > 0. Investment earns a re-
turn in excess of the user cost, f ′ > u. Additional credit is denied if higher invest-
ment violates the incentive constraint by raising private benefits more than residual
income, dve/dI = (1 − τ)(f ′ −u) < β . Multiplying by p gives the last inequality in
Proposition 1.
Figure 1 illustrates. The incentive line pβI − AR refers to the right-hand side
of (6) and gives the entrepreneur’s minimum stake that makes her willing to supply
high managerial effort, minus own capital committed to the firm. The concave curve
π is the actual income provided by the financial contract. The incentive condition is
fulfilled with investment levels that are smaller than the level determined by the inter-
section point. The slopes at this point reflect the inequalities noted in Proposition 1.
Further expanding investment and credit would violate the incentive condition. The
fact that the slope of π is positive means that a constrained firm earns an excess return
ρ and is left with profitable, unexploited investment opportunities. The maximum of
the π -curve yields unconstrained investment IFB, given by f ′(IFB) = u, which re-
duces the excess return to zero. This situation would occur if the incentive constraint
were slack at the optimal investment scale, either because agency problems are small
(small β and flat incentive line), or the firm is financially strong (high own funds A,
shifting the incentive line down). Assumption 1 excludes this case.
In a constrained equilibrium, the incentive constraint is also assumed to bind after
a small shock. Differentiating (6) shows how investment depends on the tax rate, own
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funds and private benefits:
dI = −p(f − uI) + p(1 − τ)Iu
′
m
· dτ + R
m
· dA − pI
m
· dβ, (7)
where m ≡ pβ − ρ > 0. Constrained investment falls with the profit tax. However,
the mechanism is entirely different from user cost theory. The tax reduces pledgeable
income that is available for repayment. Consequently, less external funding can be
obtained and investment must be cut, see Fig. 1.
The tightness of credit constraints may differ by firm and country characteris-
tics as discussed in the introduction. Financing problems tend to be more frequent
among younger and more innovative firms. These firms are often dependent on the
entrepreneur’s business idea and tend to have little own assets. They might suffer
to a larger extent from entrepreneurial opportunism and potential consumption of
private benefits (larger b and β) which makes it more expensive to incentivize the
entrepreneur and, thus, reduces pledgeable income. In Fig. 1, low own funds A shift
up the incentive line while a high value of β makes it steeper. Firms with these char-
acteristics are more constrained and invest at a smaller scale. The model can also
be used to illustrate cross-country differences in institutional and financial develop-
ment. Better institutions such as tighter accounting standards or anti-director rights
may be interpreted as making management more accountable which reduces private
benefits, improves access to external financing and allows a larger investment scale.
A similar case could be made with respect to financial sector productivity in mon-
itoring and advising, see Sect. 3. Financial development could thereby boost firms’
access to external financing and investment. Of course, none of these country and
firm level characteristics (except plant productivity) play a role in standard user cost
theory which applies in the absence of financial frictions.
The existence of financing constraints not only changes the impact of taxes on
investment but fundamentally alters the efficiency properties. Welfare is measured by
the social surplus of a firm which is the sum of private surplus plus the net value of
public revenue. Adding (1) and (2) and using p(1 + i) = R yields the social value12
π∗ = π + G = p(f (I) − iI ). Raising the tax rate changes welfare by
dπ∗
dτ
= p[(f ′ − u) + (u − i)] dI
dτ
. (8)
The welfare change is proportional to the total wedge between the pre-tax return and
market interest, f ′ − i. This wedge is split into a tax wedge u− i and an excess return
f ′ − u. The excess return arises because the financing constraint limits investment to
a level where the gross return exceeds the cost of capital, f ′ > u.
Proposition 2 A small profit tax rate imposes a first order welfare loss when invest-
ment is finance constrained.
12The incentive constraint assures that no private benefits are consumed. They are thus not part of the
welfare measure. In deriving (6), we have argued that an equilibrium with high effort is preferred to one
with low effort and consumption of private benefits.
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This result is independent of the specific form of the profit tax (conventional, ACE
or CF). If the tax rate is zero, the user cost is always equal to the loan rate, u = i,
which still leaves an excess return f ′ > i. Even a small tax reduces investment as in
(7) and leads to a first order welfare loss proportional to the excess return, dπ∗ =
p(f ′ − i)dI .
The question is whether ACE and CF taxes are efficient and equivalent. Both sys-
tems eliminate the tax wedge so that the user cost is equal to the lending rate, u = i,
and independent of the tax rate. However, even if the tax is neutral with respect to the
user cost, it still drains cash-flow and thereby restricts investment. Noting that u′ = 0
in (7), the impact on investment simplifies to dI/dτ = −p(f − iI )/m, where f − iI
is positive by concavity. Clearly, CF and ACE taxes are not neutral with respect to
investment when firms are finance constrained.13 Since the behavioral effects of both
tax regimes are identical, the net value of fiscal revenue, G = τp(f − iI ), and wel-
fare, π∗ = p(f − iI ), must both change by the same amount as well. In particular,
the welfare loss is again proportional to the excess return, dπ∗ = p(f ′ − i)dI .
Proposition 3 When investment is finance constrained, ACE and CF taxes (i) are
equivalent, and (ii) reduce investment and welfare.
How could tax policy succeed to induce first best investment levels? Since any
tax reduces cash-flow and constrains investment of financially weak firms, first-best
levels can only be achieved if (i) the tax does not change the user cost, as is the case
with an ACE or a CF tax; (ii) the net value of tax liability is negative, i.e. the firm
must receive cash. Condition (i) implies that the tax does not change the first-best
investment scale, indicated by IFB in Fig. 1. Condition (ii) means that a constrained
firm receives additional funds from the public. Own funds A are augmented until the
incentive constraint ‘just binds,’ i.e. the line pβI −AR in Fig. 1 is shifted down until
the intersection point occurs at IFB. ACE and CF taxes have not been designed to
address financial frictions. However, as opposed to conventional profit taxes, they tax
only above normal (excess) returns, but exclude the normal return on capital. They
raise less revenue and are, thus, less damaging to constrained investment.14
3 Active financial intermediation
In this section, we consider more active forms of financial intermediation and extend
Tirole (2006, Chap. 9) to variable investment levels. We show that an ACE tax yields
larger investment and welfare than an equal yield cash-flow tax when banks become
active and provide monitoring services in addition to finance.
13As a referee pointed out, one may draw a parallel to the labor tax literature. If the value of leisure were
deductible, a proportional tax would be neutral with respect to labor supply. If foregone private benefits
were deductible, the opportunity cost of effort would be (1 − τ)bI . Suppose also that A0 is the result of
past earnings, leaving own funds A = (1 − τ)A0 after tax. In this case, the tax factor would cancel from
(6) and the two systems would be neutral even with a binding financing constraint. Given that financial
frictions arise from private benefits being either not observable or not contractible, they can also not be
made part of the tax deductions which leads to the non-neutrality of CF and ACE taxes.
14Compensating revenue losses by raising other taxes would add distortions elsewhere.
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Model Specialized investors such as relationship banks or venture capitalists often
play a productive role in the active oversight of firms, give strategic business advice,
and thereby add value by raising a firm’s survival and growth prospects. We thus in-
troduce an advising and monitoring role of active banks that raises a firm’s success
probability. As before, high managerial effort raises the success probability to p > 0.
Shirking, for simplicity, is assumed to result in sure failure, pL = 0. However, the
success probability p depends not only on managerial effort but also on a continuous
monitoring and advising input. The bank can further raise p by more intensive mon-
itoring but incurs an intangible cost c(p)I which is proportional to investment and
convex increasing in p, c′, c′′ > 0.15 Both types of effort are non-contractible, giving
rise to double moral hazard. The surpluses of the entrepreneur and the bank are
πe = p(I + f − T − (1 + im)D) − AR,
πb = p(1 + im)D − DR − c(p)I, (9)
π = p(I + f − T ) − c(p)I − (1 − τs)RI.
As before, D = (1 − τs)I − A is external debt while T = τ [f − λim(D + A) + sI ]
and G = pT − τsIR give the value of tax revenue. The loan rate im must be set to
cover not only the opportunity cost of funds DR but also the monitoring cost c(p)I .
Monitored finance is more expensive so that the loan rate exceeds the interest which
satisfies the no-arbitrage condition p(1 + i) = R and is applied by the government,
i.e., im > i. Further, both rates are endogenous by the choice of monitoring effort
which determines p.
At the moral hazard stage, the credit contract, specifying the loan size D and
the lending rate im, is already given. The managing owner chooses effort, given the
bank’s monitoring activity. The bank chooses monitoring and advising intensity that
maximizes its surplus πb , given the entrepreneur’s effort. The two incentive con-
straints are
ICe : β(p)I  ve = (1 − τ)[f (I) − umI ] + (1 + im)A,
ICb : c′(p)I = (1 + im)D,
(10)
where the user cost um is defined in (3), using im, and β = b/p since pL = 0.
At the effort stage, interest as well as debt and investment are predetermined.
The outstanding credit determines incentives of the bank and the success probability
(ICb-constraint). Anticipating effort choice, firms invest and banks lend more until
the managerial incentive constraint binds. Approving a larger loan boosts the bank’s
surplus by dπb/dD = [p(1+ im)−R− c/(1− τs)] > 0, which is positive as long as
break even πb = [p(1 + im)−R − c/(1 − τs)]D −Ac/(1 − τs)  0 is not violated.
When the two constraints in (10) bind, they jointly determine investment, credit and
the success probability. The equilibrium values depend on interest im and result in a
banking profit.
15For simplicity and tractability, we assume that monitoring does not affect pL. Assuming monitoring
costs to be multiplicative in investment allows to relate the success probability (reflecting monitoring
intensity) to the interest rate and debt asset ratio D/I , see the optimality condition (10).
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Finally, competition among banks forces down the loan rate im until profits are
zero. Defining the debt ratio δ ≡ D/I , zero profits imply (p(1 + im) − R)δ = c(p).
The intermediation margin must cover the monitoring cost c and becomes endoge-
nous. In what follows, we assume c(p) = p1+γ /(1 + γ ). The specification implies
pc′ = (1+γ )c, which, together with the bank’s incentive and break-even constraints,
yields p(1 + im) = R(1 + γ )/γ . Given the isoelastic specification, the expected re-
payment per unit of a loan is a constant markup over the exogenous deposit rate.
Comparative statics To avoid complicated tax base effects, we start out from an un-
taxed equilibrium and limit attention to small taxes only, i.e., we evaluate the differ-
entials at τ = 0 so that u = im initially. The Appendix derives the linearized version
of the system in (10) where m = pβ − ρ and ρ = p(f ′ − im) as in Sect. 2.2:
ICe : m · dI = (I + f ) · dp − p[f − (λ + s)imI ] · dτ,
ICb : (1 + γ )D · dp = −spI · dτ + (1 − δ)p · dI.
(11)
Given monitoring, the tax reduces investment by eroding cash-flow as before. Given
investment, we find that a larger tax erodes monitoring incentives only when there
is an immediate allowance s > 0. In giving an upfront tax allowance, a CF tax re-
duces the need for external funding, leads to a smaller outstanding credit volume
and, thereby, weakens monitoring incentives.
Monitoring and investment are strategic complements. Monitoring reduces in-
centives to shirk, β ′ < 0, strengthens pledgeable income and allows more exter-
nally funded investment. Conversely, higher investment leading to larger outstand-
ing debt boosts monitoring incentives. Both reaction functions are upward sloping
in the I,p-space. Stability requires that the ICe-curve is steeper than the ICb-curve.
Otherwise, investment and monitoring would not converge to finite positive levels
after a shock. This condition requires that ∇ ≡ (1 + γ )mD − p(I + f )(1 − δ) > 0,
leading to equilibrium changes in I and p:16
dI = −pI∇
[(
f − (λ + s)imI)(1 + γ )δ + (I + f )s] · dτ,
dp = − p∇
[(
f − (λ + s)imI)(1 − δ)p + msI ] · dτ.
(12)
The factor f − (λ + s)imI simplifies to f − imI under both taxes. Since f ′ > im
with constrained investment, and f/I > f ′ with a concave technology, this factor is
positive. A small profit tax thus reduces both investment and monitoring. In particular,
monitoring is discouraged for an ACE tax as well, although it does not directly affect
monitoring and advising incentives when s = 0, see above. By impairing investment,
the ACE tax reduces outstanding credit and weakens monitoring incentives. Finally,
16The condition ∇ > 0 is fulfilled as long as the firm’s own equity is not too high.
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when starting from an untaxed equilibrium, the effect on net fiscal revenue is17
dG = [p(f − λimI + sI) − sIR] · dτ. (13)
ACE versus CF tax In comparing ACE and CF taxes, we set small tax rates such
that both taxes yield the same revenue. Suppose a small CF tax, which defines the tax
base by s = 1 and λ = 0, is introduced at a rate dτCF > 0. By (12), the tax reduces
investment and monitoring intensity by
dICF = −p(f − i
mI)(1 + γ )δ + p(I + f )
∇ I · dτ
CF,
dpCF = −p(f − i
mI)(1 − δ) + mI
∇ p · dτ
CF.
(14)
Net public revenue grows by dGCF = [p(f + I ) − IR] · dτCF. An ACE tax defines
the tax base by s = 0 and λ = 1. Raising the same revenue requires
p
(
f − imI) · dτACE = [p(f + I ) − IR] · dτCF. (15)
An equal yield ACE system thus discourages investment and monitoring by
dIACE = −[p(f + I ) − IR](1 + γ )δ∇ I · dτ
CF,
dpACE = −[p(f + I ) − IR](1 − δ)∇ p · dτ
CF.
(16)
A CF tax reduces investment and monitoring more than an equal yield ACE tax (see
the Appendix for the proof),
dICF < dIACE < 0, dpCF < dpACE < 0. (17)
The welfare consequences of these alternative tax systems are measured by the
change in the social surplus π∗ = π + G = p(I + f ) − (R + c)I :
dπ∗ = [I + f − Ic′] · dp + [p(1 + f ′) − R − c] · dI. (18)
Substituting c′I = (1 + im)D from the bank’s incentive constraint (10) into the first
bracket yields I + f − (1 + im)D = ve > 0 when the tax is zero at the outset. Hence,
stimulating monitoring boosts the entrepreneur’s surplus and, thus, yields a social
gain which banks ignore when choosing monitoring. The second bracket in (18) is
also positive. Since f ′ > im with a binding constraint, expanding investment with
more lending would raise the joint surplus by more than the bank’s profit at the mar-
gin, p(1 + f ′) − R − c > p(1 + im) − R − c > 0, with the difference going to the
entrepreneur. The last inequality holds on account of πb = 0 and δ < 1 when firms
17The government discounts with a lower interest rate i < im, given by p(1 + i) = R. The end-of-period
value of the upfront tax relief under a CF tax is thus lower than the actual ACE deduction, dGCF =
p(f − iI )dτ > dGACE = p(f − imI)dτ . An ACE tax allows deduction of actual interest imI .
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have positive equity. Stimulating investment would thus boost bank profits which
firms do not take into account. As neither side is able to fully appropriate the social
gains of their activities, investment and monitoring are too low relative to a first best
allocation.18
Proposition 4 When investment is constrained and monitoring raises success prob-
abilities, (i) ACE and CF taxes both reduce investment, monitoring and welfare, but
(ii) are no longer equivalent. An ACE system reduces investment, success rates and
welfare less than an equal yield CF tax.
In giving an upfront tax allowance, the CF tax requires less external funding and a
smaller repayment. It thus reduces the bank’s outstanding credit and impairs monitor-
ing incentives. An ACE system, in contrast, provides tax relief at the late return stage
and does not reduce external credit. With a larger repayment at risk, banks monitor
more intensively which helps to contain failure rates and credit defaults. Better suc-
cess prospects, in turn, raise the returns to managerial effort which makes it cheaper
to incentivize entrepreneurs. Hence, more intensive monitoring feeds back positively
on incentive compatible investment. In a setting of double moral hazard, the timing
of tax payments becomes important which is more favorable under the ACE tax.
Our analysis connects with the literature on efficiency in double moral hazard re-
lationships, see Holmstrom (1982) or McAfee et al. (1991). To overcome the under-
investment problem and commit themselves to a larger effort, team members could
deposit at the beginning an amount of cash with a third party (budget breaker). At the
end of the period, the deposit is paid back with interest only if the firm is success-
ful. Since the entrepreneur has no more assets at hand, the deposit simply requires a
larger credit. A larger debt strengthens monitoring incentives of the bank while the
repayment of the deposit to the firm relaxes the managerial incentive constraint. It can
be shown that such a private solution would stimulate investment and monitoring and
thereby reduce the need for corrective tax policy. However, such arrangements are
not observed in reality because, for example, the third party itself might be subject to
moral hazard (see Eswaran and Kotwal 1984). The upshot is that the tax system can
play the role of a budget breaker. Moving from a CF to an ACE tax raises the tax lia-
bility today (a deposit with the government) and gives tax relief tomorrow (repayment
to the firm).
Finally, our results do not depend on the specific modeling of monitoring. In a
Separate Appendix,19 we consider an alternative model where monitoring does not
directly add value but imposes active oversight and control to reduce the possibili-
ties for entrepreneurial misbehavior which raises pledgeable income and the firm’s
financing capacity. Active banks not only provide part of the credit but also certify
the good governance of the firm and allow other passive banks to lend more. This
alternative framework yields qualitatively identical results, i.e., an ACE tax yields
larger investment and welfare than an equal yield CF tax. The mechanism, however,
is different. Compared to a CF tax, the ACE system redistributes from unconstrained
18First best levels maximize π∗ and are implicitly determined by I + f = Ic′ and p(1 + f ′) = c + R.
19Available on www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/54285.
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Table 1 Equal yield ACE and
CF taxes Absolute values
τACE 0.000 0.050 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.250 0.300
τCF 0.000 0.046 0.093 0.142 0.194 0.252 0.319
Index values
IACE 1.000 0.962 0.924 0.887 0.849 0.812 0.776
ICF 1.000 0.957 0.912 0.867 0.818 0.766 0.702
pACE 1.000 0.999 0.998 0.996 0.995 0.993 0.991
pCF 1.000 0.994 0.988 0.980 0.970 0.957 0.936
π∗ACE 1.000 0.992 0.984 0.975 0.966 0.955 0.944
π∗CF 1.000 0.985 0.967 0.946 0.920 0.887 0.837
firms, where capital earns a normal return, towards constrained firms, where capi-
tal earns an excess return. In redistributing towards constrained firms, it relaxes the
financing constraint and boosts investment while both tax systems are neutral with
respect to investment of unconstrained firms.
Numerical illustration Our central result in (17) was derived for small tax rates
only. We also argued in (13) that the tax base of an ACE tax is smaller since it allows
deduction of actual interest which must cover monitoring costs of active banks while
the government’s discount rate is lower. Hence, an ACE tax would require a larger
tax rate compared to an equal yield CF tax. Assuming initial tax rates to be zero
keeps calculations simple by avoiding complicated tax base effects, but is clearly
a restrictive assumption. We now check by means of a numerical example whether
our result is valid also for larger tax rates. We specify f (I) = f0Iα and c(p) =
c0p1+γ /(1 + γ ) and numerically solve the non-linear (rather than the linearized)
model. The model is calibrated so that, in the absence of tax, the equilibrium levels of
investment and the success probability are I = 10 and p = 0.8, respectively. The safe
deposit rate of interest is set to 2 % (R = 1.02), implying a risky rate of i = 0.275.
This high rate reflects the assumption that the return is zero when the project fails.
Monitoring costs are assumed to be 5 % of investment spending, i.e., c(p) = 0.05
initially. Initially, the debt asset ratio is δ = D/I = 0.7, and only 30 % of assets are
self-financed with own funds (see, e.g., Tirole 2006, p. 98). The partial cash-flow
sensitivity of investment, derived from ICe in (10), is dI/dA = p(1 + im)/m ≈ 1.24
which is consistent with empirical estimates of 1.3 (cf. Fazzari and Petersen 1993;
Calomiris and Hubbard 1995; Carpenter and Petersen 2002).
In the first line of Table 1, we raise the ACE tax rate from zero to 30 % in steps
of five percentage points. The second line reports the equal yield CF tax rates that
raise the same present value of tax revenues in equilibrium. The lower part of the
table reports changes in investment levels and success probabilities under either tax
regime. The change in the social surplus of firms is a welfare measure. Comparing
the first and second columns approximates a small change in equal yield tax rates. In
line with the analytical results, we find that an ACE tax reduces the investment scale
and the survival probability by less than an equal yield CF tax. The index value of
0.957 means that the CF tax levied at a rate of 4.6 % reduces investment by 4.3 %
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which exceeds the reduction by 3.8 % under the equal yield ACE tax. Since the CF
tax impairs incentives for advising and monitoring relatively more than an ACE tax,
the firm’s success probability declines to a larger extent although the size of the effect
is rather small. The last two lines also show a relatively larger welfare loss from a CF
tax compared to an equal yield ACE tax.
As tax rates rise, the negative impact of taxes gets larger. More importantly, the
differential effect of the two tax regimes gets larger as well, making the CF tax in-
creasingly less attractive compared to an equal yield ACE tax. With an ACE tax rate
of 30 %, investment would decline by 22.4 % relative to the no tax situation. An
equal yield CF tax would reduce investment by almost 30 % instead. The reduction
in the success probability and in welfare is larger as well. Interestingly, at moderate
levels of taxation, the CF tax rate is lower than the equal yield ACE rate while, at
higher levels of taxation, it must exceed the ACE tax rate to yield the same present
value of revenue. This must be due to the more negative effect on the tax base under
the CF tax. Based on the numerical exercise, we conclude that the CF tax becomes
increasingly less attractive relative to an equal yield ACE tax when the government
must generate higher levels of revenue.
4 Conclusions
When firms are finance constrained, investment becomes sensitive to net of tax cash-
flow. Independent of their impact on the user cost, taxes cut down investment by
reducing a firm’s pledgeable income and its capacity to raise external funds. This
has important implications for tax reform. First, even small taxes lead to a first order
welfare loss when firms are constrained. Second, both CF and ACE taxes are no
longer neutral with respect to investment. Although avoiding an increase in the user
cost of capital, they still reduce cash-flow and, thereby, investment of constrained
firms. A third policy implication is that ACE and CF taxes may often not be equivalent
as is commonly believed. This non-equivalence tends to be important in situations
where financial development and efficiency in banking matters. When banks become
active and provide monitoring services in addition to finance, we find that an ACE
tax yields larger investment and welfare than an equal yield cash-flow tax. Since
innovative firms with large growth prospects relative to own funds are most likely
to be constrained and in need of more active forms of finance, our results could be
important for the most dynamic sectors of an advanced economy.
Appendix
Proof of (11) The changes in the endogenous variables p, I and, in turn, im and um
affect the (binding) incentive constraints in (10). Taking the differential of ICe and
evaluating at τ = 0 and, in turn, um = im yields
[
β − (f ′ − um)] · dI = A · dim − I · dum − (f − imI) · dτ + (β/p)I · dp. (19)
Differentiation of (3) yields dum = dim + (1 − λ − s)imdτ . Given the specification
of monitoring costs, expected repayment is a constant markup over the deposit rate,
824 C. Keuschnigg, E. Ribi
implying a relationship pdim = −(1 + im) dp. Multiplying (19) by p, substituting
these results, using m = pβ −ρ together with ρ = p(f ′ −um) and D = I −A yields
m · dI = [βI + (1 + im)D] · dp − p[f − (λ + s)imI ] · dτ. (20)
By (10), evaluated at τ = 0, the first square bracket is equal to I + f , which yields
the first equation in (11).
Taking the differential of ICb and evaluating at τ = 0 yields dD = dI − sI dτ and
Ic′′ · dp + c′ · dI = (1 + im)(dI − sI · dτ) + D · dim. (21)
Multiply by p, use pc′′ = γ c′ and c′I = (1 + im)D as well as δ = D/I , replace
pdim = −(1 + im) dp and divide by 1 + im to get the second equation in (11).
Proof of (17) We compare the investment response in (12) and (14). The CF tax
discourages investment by more than an equal yield ACE tax if (use D = δI )
p(I + f ) > (1 + γ )[p(1 + im) − R]D = (1 + γ )cI. (22)
The last equality reflects the bank’s zero profit condition. Using pc′ = (1 + γ )c to-
gether with the bank’s incentive constraint Ic′ = (1 + im)D shows that the inequality
is equivalent to 0 < I + f − (1 + im)D = ve where the right-hand side equals ve
when evaluated at τ = 0. Noting that the managerial incentive constraint in (10) re-
quires ve > 0 proves the result. Monitoring is reduced more strongly under the CF
tax if
m >
[
p
(
1 + im) − R](1 − δ) ⇔ (1 + γ )mD > (1 − δ)p(1 + im)D. (23)
The second inequality follows from πb = 0 together with (1 + γ )c = pc′ and the
optimality condition for monitoring. Since ve > 0 is equivalent to I +f > (1+ im)D,
we have 0 < ∇ < (1 + γ )mD − (1 − δ)p(1 + im)D which proves the result.
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